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In the United States, wealth is signiﬁcantly more unequally distributed than earnings. Models with
uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk have been used widely to study the determinants of wealth
inequality across households and to try to understand this fact (see Aiyagari 1994). In these
models, wealth inequality arises because a market to insure speciﬁc earnings risks does not exist
and households self-insure by accumulating an asset (assumed to be perfectly liquid) that is used
to smooth consumption over time. Our contribution is to quantitatively study the determinants
of wealth inequality in economies where households not only accumulate liquid ﬁnancial assets,
but can also save in the form of illiquid assets such as a house. In reality, houses also provide
collateral for loans. The question that we address is whether the inclusion of illiquid assets that
serve as collateral ampliﬁes or mitigates the eﬀect of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk on wealth
inequality. This project is motivated by the fact that houses comprise almost 40 percent of the total
wealth held by households in the U.S. economy. Moreover, according to the Survey of Consumer
Finances, 92 percent of all available credit to consumers is collateral credit. Collateral debt accounts
for 15.5 percent of aggregate household net worth and the average ratio of collateral credit to total
debt across households is roughly 79 percent.1
In this paper, we build a general equilibrium model economy of ex-ante identical households who
face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to their labor endowments. Households have two means of
saving: liquid ﬁnancial assets and illiquid houses. We model houses as assets that can be adjusted to
any level at a given non-convex cost. Furthermore, houses can be ﬁnanced (minus a down payment)
and can be used as collateral for home equity loans. For simplicity, we allow no other form of credit.
In our model, households derive utility from consumption of a nondurable good and from housing
services. We assume there is no rental market for houses so households obtain housing services by
purchasing residential stock. We calibrate the model economy so that its steady state statistics
match selected aggregate statistics of the U.S. economy and data on the earnings distribution. In
particular, we construct an earnings process that is a mixture of a process estimated directly from
the data plus an extra shock that allows us to jointly match the observed level of earnings and
wealth inequality. We assume there are two types of households, regular households and superstars.
The process that governs the earnings of regular households is calibrated using data for households
outside the top 1 percent of the earnings distribution of households with positive earnings in the
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF-98), and is very similar to the idiosyncratic component
1These ﬁgures are for 1998 and are similar in other years.
1of the earnings process estimated by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) using the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). We calibrate the superstar shock level and its persistence so that the
overall Gini index for earnings and wealth match those observed in the data.
Our goal is to assess the role of illiquid assets in explaining the wealth distribution. To this
end, we must compare our benchmark economy to the standard economy without illiquid assets
considered in the literature. This comparison is not straightforward. We show that, in fact,
Aiyagari’s (1994) economy is equivalent to an economy with liquid houses, no down payments,
home equity loans with a loan-to-value ratio of 1, and a perfect rental market. We call this
economy the one-asset economy. Using the same earnings process, we calibrate the one-asset
economy to produce the same aggregates as our benchmark economy. We ﬁnd that with illiquid
assets and limited collateral loans wealth inequality is just slightly lower than in the one-asset
economy. Wealth inequality is lower because the credit restriction implies that all households must
hold some wealth in the form of the required down payment (this is not the case in the one-asset
economy). The diﬀerence is small because the frictions of our model (required down payments and
adjustment costs) mainly aﬀect poor households that only account for a small fraction of aggregate
wealth. Eliminating the superstars, introducing a rental market, or imposing a minimum size for
the houses that households can purchase does not change our conclusions. However, when we lower
the persistence of the earnings process, the frictions of our model have a larger eﬀect because more
households are aﬀected by them.
In summary, the standard one-asset economy analyzed in the literature implicitly allows for
collateral loans and the fact that one asset is illiquid does not have much of an eﬀect over the
wealth distribution. Nevertheless, our richer model allows us to study other dimensions of wealth
inequality. For example, ﬁnancial assets are more concentrated than total wealth, while residential
assets are less concentrated than total wealth. Our model can replicate and explain these facts
easily. Furthermore, we document that the earnings and the housing distributions are remarkably
similar in the United States. Our model can account for this fact as long as the earnings process
is fairly persistent. Finally, we can use our framework to analyze how changes in down payment
requirements and the availability of home equity loans aﬀect the economy. We ﬁnd that as collateral
credit expands, total wealth decreases, the interest rate increases and wealth inequality—measured
by the Gini index—may worsen (more details are given throughout the paper). Furthermore, the
easing of credit has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the portfolios of poor households.
In our setup, the persistence of the earnings process for both regular households and superstars
2is essential to replicate the level of wealth inequality in the data. It is important to recognize that
this is no diﬀerent from the models that we build upon. Aiyagari (1994) already points out that
the persistence of the process that governs households’ earnings streams is key in explaining wealth
inequality. This argument is elaborated further by Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull (1997). The literature
has explored several mechanisms that could amplify the eﬀects of uninsurable labor shocks on
the level of wealth inequality. For instance, Huggett (1996) examines the role of retirement and
Social Security. Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and Nardi (2005) study the interaction of uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor risk and occupational choice, whereas Krusell and Smith (1998) and Carroll
(2000) resort to changes in preferences to account for the observed level of wealth inequality. These
papers have various degrees of success in jointly accounting for the observed level of earnings and
wealth inequality but all of them stress the diﬃculty in reproducing the observed level of wealth
inequality when the level of idiosyncratic labor risk is estimated using the PSID. Indeed, this is why
Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull (2003) construct an earnings process that allows them to
jointly account for the observed wealth and earnings inequality rather than use an earnings process
estimated directly from the data. They show that the degree of earnings variability needed to
account for the observed level of wealth inequality is much larger than the one estimated using
the PSID. Our calibration exercise is similar to that of Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull
(2003).
Our paper is part of an emerging literature that incorporates durable goods in heteroge-
nous agents models. For instance, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Prescott, Fitzgerald, and Alvarez (1992) model
durables explicitly to study the welfare eﬀects of alternative monetary policies. D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez and
Puch (1998) analyze the welfare consequences of imposing diﬀerent levels of borrowing constraints.
More recently, Luengo-Prado (2006) shows that the explicit consideration of durable goods and
collateral credit is useful for understanding the “excess smoothness” and “excess sensitivity” of
consumption. Fern´ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) consider a model with liquid durables and
replicate the hump-shaped evolution of durable and nondurable consumption expenditures over
the life-cycle. Our work is closest to Gruber and Martin (2003), although our modelling strat-
egy, calibration and focus is quite diﬀerent. Whereas Gruber and Martin analyze how transaction
costs aﬀect the volume of precautionary saving, we are more interested in the impact of changes in
collateral and illiquidity on the distributions of houses and ﬁnancial assets, as well as the wealth
composition.
32 The model economy
We consider a production economy populated by a continuum of households of measure one who live
forever. We focus our analysis on steady states. Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 describe the technology,
the preferences and endowments, and the market arrangements, respectively. Section 2.4 presents
the household problem and section 2.5 provides a formal deﬁnition of steady state equilibrium.
Section 2.6 compares our model economy to the standard economy without illiquid assets.
2.1 Technology
Aggregate output, Y , is produced according to an aggregate Neoclassical production function that
takes as inputs aggregate capital, K, and aggregate labor, L: Y = F (K,L). The ﬁnal good, can
be either consumed, invested in capital or invested in durable goods on a one-to-one basis. Thus,
the feasibility constraint is:
C + Ik + Ih = F(K,L), (1)
where C is nondurable consumption, Ik is investment in capital, and Ih is investment in residential
stock. We assume that houses and capital depreciate at the rates δh and δk respectively.
2.2 Preferences and endowments
Households derive utility from the consumption of a nondurable good, c, and from the service ﬂow,
s(h), provided by houses, h. They do not derive utility from leisure. We write the per period utility
as u(c,s(h)), and lifetime utility as
∞ 
t=0
βtu(ct,s(ht)), where β is the time discount factor. Each
period, households receive a shock to their eﬃciency units of labor e ∈ E = {e1,....,ene}.T h e
shock is Markov with transition matrix πe,e .
2.3 Market arrangements
We assume there are no state contingent markets for the household-speciﬁc shock. Households hold
residential assets h ∈ [0,∞) and ﬁnancial assets a ∈ [a,∞), a ∈ I R. Financial assets pay a net
interest rate r. For simplicity, we assume there are no diﬀerences between borrowing and lending
rates. Furthermore, there is no rental market for housing services and houses provide collateral for
4loans. In particular:
a ≥− (1 − θ)h. (2)
This constraint implies that the maximum debt a household can incur is a fraction (1 − θ)o ft h e
household’s residential stock, which determines the lower bound for a, a. The constraint summarizes
several aspects of collateral lending observed in reality. First, when purchasing a house, a household
can only ﬁnance a fraction (1 − θ) of the house’s value – i.e., the household must satisfy a down
payment requirement θ.2 Second, when a household owns a house, the household can obtain a loan
f o ru pt oaf r a c t i o n( 1− θ) of its value – i.e., there are home equity loans. In summary, at any
point in time, a household is only required to keep an accumulated home equity of θh .No t et h a t
households cannot borrow if they do not own residential assets. Finally, we assume that changing
the residential stock is costly and consider a non-convex cost of adjustment, τ(h ,h).
2.4 The household’s problem
The household’s state variables are the labor endowment shock, capital holdings, and residential
assets, {e,a,h}. The problem that a household solves is:
v(e,a,h)= m a x








e ,a  ,h  
(3)
s.t. c + a  + h  − (1 − δh)h + τ(h ,h)=we+( 1+r) a, (4)
a  +( 1− θ)h  ≥ 0. (5)
2.5 Stationary equilibrium
For notational eﬃciency, we denote x = {e,a,h} and X = {E × [a,a] × [0,h]}.W e c o n s t r u c t a
Markov process for the individual state variables from the Markov process on the shocks and the
decision rules of the agents (see Huggett 1993 or Hopenhayn and Prescott 1992 for details). Let
B be the σ-algebra generated in X by, say, the open intervals. A probability measure µ over B
exhaustively describes the economy by stating how many households there are of each type. Let
2In practice, ﬁnancial institutions require down payments for a number of reasons. For example, down payments
reduce the moral hazard problem in the care that owners take in maintaining the value of their house and they also
mitigate the eﬀects of the adverse selection problem that results from asymmetric information in the credit market.
5P(x,B) denote the probability that a type {x} has of becoming of a type in B ⊂B . The function
P naturally describes how the economy moves over time by generating a probability measure for





To ﬁnd a steady state, we look for the measure of households µ such that given the prices implied
by that measure, households’ actions reproduce the same measure µ in the following period. For-
mally, a steady state equilibrium for this economy is a set of functions for the household problem
{v(x),ga(x),gh(x),gc(x)}, and a measure of households, µ, such that:
1. Factor inputs are obtained by aggregating over households: K =

X ad µ ,a n dL =

X ed µ .
Analogously, H =

X hd µ .
2. Factor rental prices are factor marginal productivities: r = F1(K,L) −δk and w = F2(K,L).




solve the household’s problem.


























5. The feasibility constraint is satisﬁed: C + Ik + Ih = F(K,L).
6. The measure of households is stationary: x(B)=

X P(x,B) dµ, for all B ⊂B .
In our benchmark economy we abstract from a housing rental market. There are, however,
several frictions in place, in particular, adjustment costs and a down payment. In order to under-
stand the role of each friction as well as the importance of the rental market, we will compare our
benchmark economy to an alternative economy where all these frictions are absent.
2.6 The one-asset economy: an economy with a perfect rental market and
without transaction costs or collateral requirements
Our goal is to explore the role of illiquid assets in shaping the wealth distribution. In order to
do this, we must compare our benchmark economy to the standard economy in the literature of
heterogeneous agents with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. An example of the latter framework is
Aiyagari (1994). In his model there is a single liquid asset, net worth must be non-negative and
6households derive utility from consumption of a nondurable good only. The comparison of Aiyagari’s
economy and our benchmark economy is not straightforward. Nevertheless, we can construct an
alternative economy that is equivalent to Aiyagari’s. Assume that houses are liquid assets and that
they can be fully ﬁnanced (ρ =0 ,θ = 0). Furthermore, assume there is a perfect rental housing
market. Let s denote housing services and i the rental price of housing. The household’s budget
constraint becomes:
c + a  + h  − (1 − δh)h + is= we+( 1+r) a + ih, (7)
and the liquidity constraint is:
a  + h  ≥ 0, (8)
In this economy, the consumption of housing services is not tied to housing asset holdings since
households can purchase additional services in the market or rent part of their residential stock to
others if so choose. In equilibrium, the return to ﬁnancial assets and houses must be the same,
i = r + δh, and a household’s level of nondurable consumption and housing services is invariant
to the household’s portfolio composition. That is, households only care about their total asset
holdings, a + h. This economy, in equilibrium, is equivalent to Aiyagari’s economy. Hereafter,
we refer to it as the one-asset economy. We provide a more detailed description as well as an
equilibrium concept in Appendix A.
3 Calibration
In this section, we present the calibration of our benchmark two-asset economy in the following
order: the earnings process, the technology, preferences and market arrangements. Then, we present
the calibration for the one-asset economy. Parameter values are summarized in Table 3.
3.1 The earnings process
To construct our earnings process we must decide on the statistics in the U.S. data that we would
like to match. The ﬁrst step is summarizing the data (we use data from the SCF-98). We construct
measures for labor earnings, housing wealth, ﬁnancial assets and household net worth. The labor
earnings and net worth measures are constructed following Budria, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Quadrini, and
7R´ ıos-Rull (2002). Brieﬂy, labor earnings are computed as labor income plus a proportion of capital
income attributed to labor for business owners, all before taxes and transfers. Net worth corresponds
to total wealth in our model, h + a. Housing wealth corresponds to our variable housing stock,
h, and measures the total value of the house (not just housing equity). Financial assets, a,a r e
calculated as the diﬀerence between net worth and housing wealth for each household. In this
setup, mortgages are a negative position in ﬁnancial assets.
There are two main data sources on household earnings and wealth data that we could use:
the PSID and the SCF. The PSID is a longitudinal data set and particularly useful for measuring
earnings over time. However, the SCF is speciﬁcally designed to measure household wealth. Ac-
cording to Juster, Smith, and Sttaford (1999), the PSID underestimates the value of home equity
for all homeowners when compared to the SCF by about 10 percent and the bias increases with a
household’s wealth. Juster, Smith, and Sttaford (1999) also ﬁnd that while the PSID does a good
job in representing household net worth for the bottom 99 percent of wealth distribution, it does
a poor job for the top 1 percent. Also, in the PSID earnings are top coded. While the purpose
of this paper is not to explain why earnings of the top 1 percent of the population are so large,
we must acknowledge that the existence of these households may be important to understand the
consumption and saving behavior for the rest of the population. Thus, for our calibration we rely
mainly on the SCF.
Given that our model is dynastic with no life-cycle features or business owners, we choose to
match wealth and earnings statistics for households with positive earnings.3 In the SCF-98, 77.71
percent of the households report positive earnings and they hold 78.85 percent of aggregate wealth.
Table 1 shows, for the selected sample, the Gini coeﬃcients and the distribution across quintiles
of earnings, housing wealth, ﬁnancial assets and total wealth, along with a portfolio composition
measure (housing wealth over total wealth). For comparison purposes, we also report the same
statistics for all households. The Gini index for earnings in the full sample is 0.606 vs. 0.497
for households with positive earnings. The Gini indices for houses and wealth, however, are very
similar for both groups; 0.656 vs. 0.649, and 0.796 vs. 0.804, respectively. Likewise, the portfolio
composition across quintiles, in the rows labeled H/W, are remarkably similar in both samples.
This similarity give us conﬁdence that our simpliﬁcation may be without loss of generality.
To calibrate the earnings process, we proceed as follows. We divide households with positive
earnings in two groups: superstars (the top 1 percent of the distribution) and regular households
3Households with zero earnings are mainly retirees, while households with negative earnings tend to be business
owners.
8(the rest). We divide regular households in six groups of even size. For regular households we
assume, as is standard in the literature, that log earnings follow the AR(1) process: loget =
ρloget−1 +ηt. We choose a highly persistent process, ρ =0 .989, with volatility σ2
η =0 .0158.4 This
combination delivers a Gini index for earnings of regular households equal to 0.433 (vs. 0.432 in
the data), and a coeﬃcient of variation (CV) for earnings of 0.84, very similar to the one in the
SCF-98 for households outside the top 1 percent of the earnings distribution.5 We approximate the
AR(1) process by a 6-point Markov chain using the procedures described in Tauchen (1986). Next,
we choose the superstar earnings shock to be 6 times the highest shock for regular households (in
the SCF-98 the equivalent number is e7/e6 =6 .26). We assume all regular households have the
same probability of becoming a superstar. For simplicity, the probability that a superstar becomes a
regular household of type i =1 ,...,6 is the same for all types. With these restrictions, we have two
parameters left: the probability of becoming a superstar and the probability of becoming a regular
worker. We chose them so that superstars represent 1 percent of the earnings distribution and the
Gini index for wealth is that observed in the data, 0.804. The resulting overall Gini coeﬃcient
for earnings is also very close to the one observed in the data, (0.494 in the model vs. 0.497 in
the data). Table 2 summarizes the process. Note that the probability of becoming a superstar is
low, 0.05 percent, and the persistence of the shock is high—the probability of a superstar staying
a superstar next period is 95.05 percent.
We calibrate the earnings process so that the Gini index for wealth in our benchmark economy
is equal to that of the U.S. economy while also reproducing the Gini coeﬃcient for earnings. Our
objective is to understand the eﬀect of the existence of illiquid assets on wealth inequality. Note
that our calibration strategy is not inconsistent with our objective. The reason is the following. We
want to determine whether illiquid assets, and the market frictions they entail, amplify (or mitigate)
the eﬀect of uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk on the level of wealth inequality. To this end,
we compare two economies: our benchmark economy with all frictions in place and the one-asset
economy, free of all those frictions. We calibrate both economies to produce the same aggregates
and we use the same earnings process. Thus, the relevant comparison is in the diﬀerence in the
level of wealth inequality observed in the one-asset economy compared to the benchmark economy.
4The persistence and volatility of the AR(1) process for regular household earnings we use are very similar to the
numbers calculated by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) using data from the PSID for idiosyncratic earnings
net of cohort eﬀects (ρ =0 .9989 and σ
2
η =0 .0166). Their earnings represent gross wage income plus transfers, slightly
diﬀerent from our deﬁnition. Moreover, they allow for transitory shocks and ﬁxed eﬀects (two types of households)
which we do not model here.
5The CVfor college graduates is 0.8 and for non-college graduates is 0.81. When we combine them together, the
CVis 0.88. Since in our model all households are ex-ante identical, we choose the average of the combined sample
and the individual samples.
9If wealth inequality was higher in the benchmark economy, we would conclude that illiquid assets
and credit frictions amplify the eﬀects of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk on wealth inequality
and vice versa.
3.2 Technology
We need to construct measures of output, capital, the stock of houses (Y , K, H), and their
investment counterparts according to an appropriate criterion. We use data from the National
Income and Product Accounts (henceforth NIPA) and the Fixed Assets Tables (henceforth FAT),
both from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We deﬁne capital as the sum of non-residential private
ﬁxed assets plus the stock of inventories plus consumer durables. Investment in capital, Ik, is deﬁned
accordingly. H is private residential stock and Ih is private residential investment. Finally, we need
a measure of output, Y . In our benchmark economy, output consists of labor income plus income
from non-residential capital: Y = F(K,L)=wL+rK= C+Ik+Ih. Thus, output is measured as
GDP minus housing services.6 We proceed as Cooley and Prescott (1995) to calculate the capital
share of our economy. We do not make any imputation to output for government owned capital
since are focus is on privately held wealth. The implied share of capital in output is 0.26. The
capital-output ratio is 1.64 and the housing-output ratio is 1.07.7 We set the depreciation rate of
capital so that it matches the investment-capital ratio, 0.12. The implied steady state interest rate
is 3.91 percent.8
Finally, we need a measure of GDP in our model economy. GDP is simply output, Y ,p l u s
housing services. We follow Cooley and Prescott (1995) and set GDP=Y + iH,w h e r ei = r + δh
is the implicit rental price for housing services. The resulting capital-GDP ratio is 1.51 and the
corresponding housing-GDP ratio is 0.98. The aggregate ratio (K + H)/GDP is 2.49. The share
of capital income to GDP in our model, once we impute housing services, is 31 percent, slightly
lower than that estimated by Prescott (1986).
6We include net exports in our measure of capital investment.
7The ratio of residential stock to total net worth in the SCF-98 is 0.391, whereas in NIPA the corresponding ratio,
H/(H + K), is equal to 0.395. Thus, both sources are consistent in the aggregate portfolio.
8The ﬁgures we report are averages for the sample period 1954-1999.
103.3 Preferences
For preferences over consumption of the nondurable good and housing services, we follow Luengo-
Prado (2006) and use the separable utility function u(c,s(·)) = c1−σ
1−σ + γ
s(·)1−σ
1−σ . We assume that
housing services are proportional to the housing stock and set the constant of proportionality to
one. σ, the risk aversion parameter is 2. The calibration of γ and δh is not straightforward due to
the presence of adjustment costs. In the steady state, Ih is δh H plus the aggregate adjustment cost.
We choose values for γ and δh to jointly match the ratio of housing to nondurable consumption
and the housing-output ratio in NIPA (H/C =1 .40 and H/Y =1 .07, respectively). This implies
γ =0 .166 and δh =0 .0367. The discount factor, β =0 .9006, is such that the net interest rate in
the steady state is 3.91 percent.
3.4 Market arrangements
We use a down payment of 20 percent, slightly below the 25 percent average down payment for the
period 1963-2001 reported by the Federal Housing Finance Board. Thus, individuals can borrow
up to 80 percent of the value of the durable.9 While in reality households may be able to acquire
houses with lower down payments, it is also the case that these households face higher marginal
borrowing costs (including a higher interest rate and the purchase of mortgage insurance). To keep
the model tractable, the down payment parameter is the same for all consumers and the borrowing
rate is not a function of θ. We report results for higher and lower down payments in section 5 to
assess the robustness of our results.
We consider non-convex costs of adjustment in the market for houses, which result in infrequent
changes of the residential stock. We assume households pay the adjustment cost every time the
value of the stock changes. The idea underlying this assumption is that a household can buy a
house of any desired size, but once it has been bought the stock is illiquid. In order to change the
house, the household needs to sell the stock and selling it entails transaction costs. We assume that
right after consuming housing services the stock depreciates at the rate δh, and that if a household
lets the house depreciate, the household must pay the adjustment cost (i.e., we force households to
9When purchasing a new residence, household must put a 20 percent down payment. Also, (1 − θ)r e p r e s e n t st h e
maximum loan-to-value ratio for home equity loans. Note there are no fees associated to obtaining collateral loans
in the model.
11do maintenance of the stock).10 In particular, the speciﬁcation of the adjustment cost is:
τ(h ,h)=Iρ(1 − δh)h, (9)
where I =0i fh  = h, and 1 otherwise. This cost can be seen as a loss in the selling price
when changing the housing stock. Note that once the household decides to change the stock, the
adjustment cost is proportional to the inherited level of residential assets, ρ(1 − δh)h.W i t ht h i s
speciﬁcation, the transaction cost does not quickly diminish in importance as households become
wealthier, as with a purely ﬁxed cost. In our benchmark case, we set ρ equal to 5 percent (the
typical fee charged by real estate brokers in the U.S. economy is around 6 percent). Computational
details on how to compute the model are given in Appendix C.
3.5 The one-asset economy
In an economy with no transaction costs, a zero down payment, and a perfect rental market, the
return to ﬁnancial assets is the same as the market return for housing. Therefore, the household
portfolio composition cannot be determined. Additionally, the consumption of housing services is
not tied to the household’s holdings of residential assets. Households can acquire additional housing
services or sell housing services to others in the rental market. In this case, the price of housing
services aﬀects the composition of the consumption basket (nondurable consumption vs. housing
services) but not the savings decision. Thus, the household problem can be written in terms of two
state variables, earnings and total assets (a + h). More details are given in Appendix A.
Our calibration strategy is such that both the benchmark economy and the one-asset economy
produce the same capital-output, housing-output and housing-nondurable ratios. The parameter
in the utility function, γ =0 .161, is chosen to match the ratio of residential stock to nondurable
consumption in the data, H/C =1 .40.11 The depreciation rate of houses, δh,i ss e ts ot h a ti t
matches the housing investment-stock ratio in the data, 0.043. The discount factor, β =0 .904,
is chosen so that the ratio of total wealth to GDP, (K + H)/GDP is equal to 2.49. The share
of capital and the depreciation rate of capital do not change. Table 3 summarizes the calibration
parameters for both the benchmark economy and the one-asset economy (the other rows in the
10The maintenance speciﬁcation is convenient for computational reasons. Allowing for depreciation instead of
imposing maintenance did not change the results signiﬁcantly. However, the pattern of durable purchases would be
very diﬀerent in both cases. Allowing for depreciation generates (S,s) dynamics for the household stock of houses
while maintenance does not.
11From the F.O.C. of the problem, it is easy to show that H/C =( γ/i)
1/σ.
12table correspond to alternative economies that are discussed later on).
4R e s u l t s
4.1 The wealth distribution
Table 4 shows wealth distribution and wealth composition statistics for the benchmark economy
that we can compare to the ones from the data summarized in Table 1. Wealth is unequally
distributed with a Gini index of 0.801 (this is because of our calibration strategy). In our model
as in the data, houses are more equally distributed than ﬁnancial assets. The Gini coeﬃcient for
houses is 0.483 (0.649 in the data), while the Gini coeﬃcient for ﬁnancial assets is 0.93 (0.945 in the
data).12 Also, houses represent a smaller proportion of wealth for the rich (as in the data). Since the
return to housing is the marginal utility of the services it renders and marginal utility is decreasing,
this is not surprising. The model fares remarkably well in the wealth-composition dimension given
that we abstract from several factors that may aﬀect the composition of a household’s portfolio,
such as taxes, house price changes and life-cycle eﬀects. For instance, our model predicts that
households in the bottom 40 percent of the wealth distribution hold, on average, 339 percent of
their wealth as houses, whereas this number is 280 percent in the data. For the top quintile, the
predicted ratio in the model is 24, while it is 27 in the data.
Next, Table 4 presents wealth distribution statistics for the one-asset economy. In this case,
we cannot distinguish between ﬁnancial assets and houses and concentrate on total wealth. The
Gini index for wealth is slightly lower in the benchmark economy than in the one-asset economy,
0.801 and 0.816, respectively. Inequality is lower in the benchmark economy (which does not allow
for a rental market) because all households have some wealth in the form of the required down
payment. The diﬀerence between both economies is small because the frictions of our model (down
payments and adjustment costs) mainly aﬀect the poor who only account for a small fraction of
aggregate wealth. In the one-asset economy, both the down payment and the adjustment cost are
zero (as opposed to 20 and 5 percent,respectively, in the benchmark case). That is, there is more
credit and more liquidity in the one-asset economy than in the benchmark economy. Lowering the
down payment only aﬀects households who are constrained at the margin, typically poor households.
Moreover, the larger the house a individual owns, the higher the possible loan. That is, collateralized
12Since ﬁnancial assets may be negative, the reported Gini index is corrected following Chen, Tsaur, and Rhai
(1982) and still between 0 and 1.
13loans of this type provide more credit to households who may need it less. In addition, wealthy
households do not need to change their houses as often as less wealthy ones, the reason being that
the variance of their income is lower than that of poor households because earnings represent a
lower fraction of their income.
Aside from houses being illiquid, we have made two assumptions that may be important for
understanding the diﬀerences between the benchmark economy and the one-asset economy. The
ﬁrst is the absence of a housing rental market. The second is the minimum house size that a
household can purchase. We analyze each in turn.
4.2 The role of the housing rental market
In our benchmark economy, houses have a very similar distribution to that of earnings. In the
data, however, houses are much more concentrated. In the model, the Gini indices for earnings and
houses are 0.499 and 0.483, respectively, whereas in the data they are 0.497 and 0.649 (compare
Table 4 and Table 1). This discrepancy may be explained by the fact that we are abstracting from
a housing rental market. Thus, the question we address here is whether the existence of a rental
market has an impact on the level of wealth inequality.
To investigate this possibility, we consider an alternative economy with an explicit rental market.
Households can obtain housing services either by purchasing them in the market or by buying
housing stock. We proceed as in Gervais (2002) and assume there is a ﬁnancial intermediary that
buys housing stock and sells housing services in the market. Our main simpliﬁcation is that the
ﬁnancial intermediary is not subject to adjustment costs when transacting the housing stock. As
commonly used in the tenure choice literature (see Henderson and Ioannides 1983), we assume
rental units depreciate at a higher rate than owner-occupied units to capture possible moral hazard
problems in the rental market. We have labeled this economy the choice economy (we provide a more
detailed description, as well as an equilibrium concept in Appendix B). Importantly, the economy
is calibrated so that it produces the same aggregates as both the one-asset and the benchmark
economy (parameters shown in Table 3). When calibrating the model we have one extra target,
the homeownership rate (roughly 69 percent in the U.S.) and one more parameter, the additional
depreciation of rental units, δf. An incremental depreciation of 0.6 percent allows us to obtain our
target. The bottom panel of Table 4 presents the comparable wealth distribution measures.
Without a rental market, all households must buy some housing stock. Therefore, they are
14forced to keep some savings in the form of the required down payment. However, this wealth is
illiquid. Since poor households face more ﬂuctuations in their income than relatively rich households
(uncertain earnings are a higher proportion of total income for them), they feel more compelled to
build a buﬀer stock of liquid assets to smooth their nondurable consumption. With a rental market,
poor households can rent instead instead of owning a house and they do not need to accumulate
extra savings, and as a result, wealth inequality is slightly higher than in the one-asset economy
(the Gini index for total wealth increases from 0.801 to 0.809). The eﬀect on total wealth inequality
is small because the introduction of the rental market aﬀects mainly the poor who account for just
a small fraction of total wealth. However, the eﬀect on the distribution of houses is signiﬁcant.
The Gini coeﬃcient for houses rises from 0.483 to 0.585, closer to the number in the data, 0.649.
In summary, inequality in houses substantially increases when a rental market is introduced but
the overall level of wealth inequality rises just slightly.
4.3 The role of the minimum house size
In our computation strategy so far, we have not imposed any minimum house size available to
consumers. Households can buy or rent whatever size house they desire. In absence of a rental
market, imposing a minimum size for the houses individuals can purchase would produce a lower
wealth inequality than in the benchmark economy. Without a rental market, households are forced
to save more to accumulate the down payment if the house they must purchase is bigger. Poor
households, who are most likely aﬀected, have to increase their savings proportionally more than
wealthier ones. Also, by increasing the minimum size we are compressing the variance of the housing
distribution. As a result, wealth inequality must be lower.
In the choice economy, however, the result would be the opposite. The larger the smallest
house available, the higher the earnings of the household who is indiﬀerent between renting and
buying, and the higher the fraction of households who rent. Therefore, the fraction of households
whose portfolio return is equal to the interest rate is higher, and wealth inequality must be larger
the larger the house minimum size. Nevertheless, inequality is never larger than in the one-asset
economy, the case in which all households get the same portfolio return. The reason is the following.
Consider the extreme case in which the minimum house size is so large that all households rent
(and the economy is calibrated to produce the same aggregates). Further, assume that there is no
moral hazard problems (i.e., the depreciation rate of owner occupied units and rental units is the
same). In this economy, housing services are produced by a ﬁnancial intermediary and households
15only hold liquid ﬁnancial assets. The ﬁnancial intermediary decides what proportion of ﬁnancial
assets is rented out to the ﬁrm as capital and what proportion is sold to household as housing
services (in equilibrium both returns are the same). In the one-asset economy, a household’s wealth
is composed of ﬁnancial assets and houses but both are equally liquid so the two economies are
equivalent. This can be seen by comparing the second and fourth panels in Table 4: the one-asset
economy and the high minimum size economy just described produce identical distributions.13
4.4 The role of superstars
Our calibration of the persistence of the superstar shock is guided by the Gini index for wealth
we want to match. However, we cannot estimate this persistence from standard data sets. This
is not the case for the process governing regular households’ shocks, which is very close to the
idiosyncratic component of the earnings process estimated by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2004) using data from the PSID. What is the contribution of superstars in shaping the overall level
of wealth inequality? To answer this question, we eliminate the superstar shock and recalibrate all
economies so that they still produce the same aggregates. The results are shown in Table 5.
The Gini index for wealth falls to 0.645, whereas in the benchmark economy with superstars
the Gini index for regular households is 0.75 (its counterpart in the data is 0.77, see Table 1).
Importantly, wealth inequality is slightly lower in the benchmark economy than in the one-asset
economy and the diﬀerence in the Gini indices is about the same magnitude as in the speciﬁcation
with superstars. Thus, adding the superstars not only helps us bring the overall Gini coeﬃcient for
wealth closer to that of the data, but it also helps us obtain the implied level of wealth inequality
for households outside the top 1 percent of the earnings distribution. Eliminating superstars,
however, does not change our main result: the existence of illiquid assets and credit frictions
mitigate somewhat the eﬀect of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk on wealth inequality resulting
in slightly lower inequality.
4.5 The role of the persistence of the earnings process
Our benchmark model with illiquid assets and credit frictions delivers just slightly lower wealth
inequality than the standard one-asset economy used in the literature. This result is obtained
using an earnings process with very high persistence (consistent with the empirical evidence). To
13The small diﬀerences in the second decimal point for the quintiles are due to numerical error. In our computations
of the economy with a high minimum size, we set the smallest house size to be 8 times the highest earnings shock.
16determine if our result is robust to this speciﬁcation, we simulate our model economy using a
diﬀerent transition matrix for the earnings process holding the earnings shocks and the stationary
distribution constant. In particular, we keep the probability of becoming a superstar unchanged
but assume the probability of being one of the six regular types is the same for all types. The
transition matrix is shown in Table 6. We recalibrate the relevant parameters so that aggregate
statistics remain the same (the parameter values are in the notes to Table 7). We call this economy
the volatile benchmark economy.
With lower persistence in the earnings process, wealth inequality is much lower than before
(the Gini index is 0.635 in the volatile bechmark case). Houses are more equally distributed (the
Gini coeﬃcient is 0.256) and ﬁnancial assets are less concentrated (the Gini coeﬃcient is 0.863).
Housing wealth as a fraction of total wealth decreases in all quintiles – since earnings shocks are not
persistent, households accumulate proportionally more liquid assets. As with the persistent earnings
process, housing wealth as a fraction of total wealth decreases with wealth but the diﬀerences across
quintiles are less extreme. In the one-asset economy, wealth is also less concentrated (the Gini index
is 0.676). Importantly, inequality is still higher in the volatile one-asset economy than in the volatile
benchmark economy. Moreover, the diﬀerence is now more pronounced. In order to understand
why this is the case, it is useful to construct a measure of permanent earnings in our model.
Since we abstract from aggregate uncertainty, for any household whose earnings shock in period
t is e,w ec a nw r i t ep e r m a n e n te a r n i n g s , e, as the sum of current and future earnings:
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(10)
The (normalized) permanent earnings shocks with the volatile process and the original process
are: {1.00,1.01,1.01,1.02,1.04,1.09,7.38} and {1.00,1.22,1.49,1.84,2.32,3.04,13.07}, respectively.
Regular households are much more similar with the more volatile earnings process, they save less,
which leads to lower inequality. For the same reason, houses are more similar across households,
which results in less diﬀerences in wealth composition across quintiles. Furthermore, with less
savings, more households are likely to be aﬀected by the frictions of our model, which explains the
larger diﬀerence in inequality between the benchmark economy and the one-asset economy in this
case. However, the diﬀerence in wealth inequality across models is still modest in magnitude.
This calibration allows us to illustrate further the predictions of our model regarding the dis-
tribution of houses. Table 8 presents key distributional statistics for homeowners in the data (ﬁrst
17panel) and in the model with both persistent and volatile earnings (second panel and third panels
respectively). With persistent earnings, the Gini index for earnings is lower in the model than in
the data (0.408 vs. 0.479 in the data). This implies lower levels of inequality for any dimension
of wealth but, nevertheless, the model with persistent earnings captures the remarkable similarity
of the distributions of earnings and houses observed in the data. This feature of the data is not
speciﬁc to 1998 as shown in Table 9 (although houses are becoming slightly more concentrated
than earnings in the recent years). In our model, houses cannot be more unequally distributed
than earnings for homeowners because the return to owner occupied housing falls with the size of
the house. Note that with volatile earnings, the Gini coeﬃcient for houses is less than half the coef-
ﬁcient for earnings (0.179 vs. 0.449).14 What causes this diﬀerence? The distributions of earnings
and houses are quite close with persistent earnings in our model because permanent earnings and
current earnings are highly correlated and households acquire houses according to their permanent
income.15 While permanent income still guides house purchases with volatile earnings, current
earnings in this case are not highly correlated with permanent income and the distributions are not
alike.
In summary, high persistence is necessary to obtain a Gini index for wealth close to the one
observed in the data. Nevertheless, earnings persistence cannot be estimated directly using the
Survey of Consumer Finances.16 Our analysis in this section suggests that the distribution of
houses might be used to discriminate among earnings processes that diﬀer in their persistence.
That is, the distribution of houses gives us indirect evidence of the persistence of the earnings
process.
5 Changes in the down payment and the adjustment cost
Over the last few decades, there has been a signiﬁcant reduction in the down payment required by
ﬁnancial institutions as well as a proliferation of home equity loans. In our model, a decrease in the
parameter θ captures these ﬁnancial changes (although we cannot disentangle one from the other).
We analyze the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on aggregate ratios and on the wealth distribution
14Interestingly, inequality in earnings for homeowners is higher with volatile earnings than with persistent earnings.
This is because the homeownership rate increases for the lower quintiles. Refer to the row labeled ‘Homeowners by
E,% ’i nT a b l e7 .
15In the case in which households are liquidity constrained the correlation between houses and earnings should be
stronger regardless of the persistence of the earnings process.
16See Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull (2003) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) for a discussion
about the problems of the methods used to estimate the persistence of the earnings process using data.
18by simulating our model economy for diﬀerent values of the down payment requirement (keeping
all other parameters constant).
A decrease in the down payment requirement relaxes the borrowing constraint. Thus, fewer
households are constrained and their purchases of houses increase. Therefore, inequality in houses
should decrease (see Table 10). However, because a decrease in θ implies higher borrowing in the
economy, ﬁnancial assets become more concentrated and overall, wealth inequality worsens. In
general, the observed eﬀects tend to be small. This is because changes in the down payment aﬀect
mainly liquidity constrained households, who are concentrated at the bottom of the wealth distri-
bution. Since their asset holdings amount to a very small fraction of aggregate wealth, the eﬀect of
changing the down payment on total wealth is not large. For instance, the Gini of wealth with no
down payment is 0.81, while with a 20 percent down payment it is 0.801. When the down payment
is 100 percent, the Gini coeﬃcient for wealth is substantially lower, 0.736. Table 10 demonstrates
that the distribution of ﬁnancial assets across quintiles is signiﬁcantly more concentrated for lower
down payments. The counterpart to this result is in Table 11, where we show that the portfolio of
poor households becomes substantially more illiquid as down payments fall. Table 11 also indicates
that with lower down payments, the housing stock increases, the capital stock decreases and the
interest rate rises (from 3.473 for a 100 percent down payment to 3.996 for no down payment).
With a rental market, as down payments decrease, homeownership increases (results not tab-
ulated for brevity). For example, with a down payment of 50 percent, homeownership is only 49
percent, while with a 5 percent down payment the rate is 83 percent. As a result, inequality in hous-
ing decreases considerably more than without a rental market (the corresponding Gini coeﬃcients
for housing for a 50 percent and a 5 percent down payment are 0.68 and 0.55 respectively). As be-
fore, because there is more borrowing, ﬁnancial assets become more concentrated with lower down
payments. The eﬀect on overall inequality is even smaller in this case and can be non-monotonic in
the down payment. For example, going from a 50 percent to a 20 percent down payment leads to
less inequality (the Gini index for wealth goes from 0.8116 to 0.809), while going from a 20 percent
t oa5p e r c e n td o w np a y m e n ti n c r e a s e si n e q u a l i t ys l i g h t l y( t h eG i n ii n d e xi n c r e a s e sf r o m0 . 8 0 9t o
0.8121). However, with or without a rental market, when down payments decrease the housing
stock increases, the capital stock decreases and the interest rate rises (the equilibrium interest rate
in the choice economy with a 50 percent down payment is 3.87 percent while the interest rate is
3.95 percent with a 5 percent down payment).
We also investigate the eﬀect of changes in the degree of illiquidity of houses. In Table 10, we
19report aggregates with a higher adjustment cost, with no adjustment costs and for an economy
with liquid houses and no down payments (ρ =0 ,θ = 0). As before, all remaining parameters are
kept at their benchmark values. For a given down payment, lowering ρ makes the durable more
attractive for households of all wealth levels, which leads to an important increase in the housing
stock. Thus, the change in aggregate wealth composition seems more dramatic than the eﬀect of
lowering down payments. Since the housing stock increases, the capital stock decreases and the
interest rate sharply rises (from 3.71 to 4.25 when going from 10 percent to 0 percent in transaction
costs). However, the eﬀect on the wealth distribution is negligible. In terms of wealth composition
(see Table 11), decreasing the degree of illiquidity increases the housing wealth to total wealth ratio
substantially for the lower quintiles.
6 Final comments
In this paper, we explicitly model the existence of illiquid houses that serve as collateral for loans
in the context of a heterogenous agents model with uninsurable earnings risk. Our goal is to asses
whether the availability of houses mitigates the eﬀect of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk on
wealth inequality. In our model, households can save in the form of a liquid asset and in the form
of illiquid houses that can be purchased on credit (minus a down payment). Our economy delivers
slightly less wealth inequality than the one-asset economy analyzed in the literature. We show that
the standard model is indeed equivalent to an economy with liquid houses, a zero down payment
and a perfect rental market. The diﬀerence in terms of wealth inequality between both economies
is small because the frictions of our model (required down payments and adjustment costs) mainly
aﬀect the poor who only account for a small fraction of aggregate wealth.
Importantly, our two-asset economy has one main advantage over the standard one-asset frame-
work: it allows us to study wealth composition issues. Our model is able to reproduce all main
patterns of the U.S. distribution: (1) wealth is more concentrated than earnings, (2) ﬁnancial as-
sets are more concentrated than wealth, (3) households’ portfolios become more liquid as wealth
increases, and (4) the distribution of houses and earnings for homeowners are very similar. A fairly
persistent earnings process is necessary to obtain the latter result. We also show that the easing of
collateral credit has an important eﬀect on the portfolios of the relatively poor.
In this study, we abstract from some important issues that remain topics for future research.
The most obvious and potentially important one, is the omission of life-cycle eﬀects. In the data,
20a household’s portfolio composition varies with age and it would be interesting to analyze whether
or not the model can account for the life-cycle patterns of wealth holding and wealth composition.
Also, some of the aggregate eﬀects discussed in this paper may be ampliﬁed when including life cycle
considerations. An further extension could deal with the interaction between collateral credit and
earnings ability. For example, access to collateral credit could increase the probability of becoming
as u p e r s t a r . 17
Appendices
A The one-asset economy
A.1 The household’s problem
A household derives utility from consumption of a nondurable good, c, and housing services obtained
through the rental market, s. The price per unit of housing services is i. Households may hold
both ﬁnancial assets, a, and residential assets, h. The stock of houses h is liquid and can be fully
ﬁnanced.






πe,e  v(e ,a  ,h  )
s.t. c + a  + h  − (1 − δh)h + is= we+( 1+r) a + ih,
a  + h  ≥ 0.
(11)
A.2 Deﬁnition of equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium for this economy is a set of functions for the household problem
{v(x),ga(x),gh(x),gc(x),gs(x)}, and a measure of households, µ, such that:
1. The durable rental market clears: S =

X gs(x) dµ =

X hd µ .
2. Factor inputs are: K =

X ga(x) dµ and L =

X ed µ .
3. Factor rental prices are factor marginal productivities: r = F1(K,L) −δk and w = F2(K,L).
4. The housing rental price satisﬁes i − δh = r.
17Becoming a superstar may require some innate ability plus an initial investment.






























7. The feasibility constraint is satisﬁed: C + Ik + Ih = F(K,L).
8. The measure of households is stationary: x(B)=

X P(x,B) dµ, for all B ⊂B .
A.3 Computation of the Equilibrium
Since in this case households only care about total assets and the portfolio composition cannot be
determined, we assume, without loss of generality, that all housing services are acquired through
the rental market and that households hold a single asset, b = a + h. The household problem that
we actually solve when computing the equilibrium is:
v(e,b)= m a x
c≥0,s≥0,b   u(c,s)+β

e 
πe,e  v (e ,b  )
s.t. c + b  + is= we+( 1+r) b,
b  ≥ 0.
(12)
A steady state equilibrium for this economy is a set of functions for the household problem
{v(x),gb(x),gc(x),gs(x)}, and a measure of households, µ, such that:
1. Factor inputs are: K =

X [gb(x) − gs(x)] dµ and L =

X ed µ .
2. Factor rental prices are factor marginal productivities: r = F1(K,L) −δk and w = F2(K,L).
3. The housing rental price satisﬁes i − δh = r.
4. The durable rental market clears: S =

X gs(x) dµ = H.




solve the household’s decision
problem.
6. The markets for nondurable consumption, houses, and capital clear:
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7. The feasibility constraint is satisﬁed: C + Ik + Ih = F(K,L).
228. The measure of households is stationary: x(B)=

X P(x,B) dµ, for all B ⊂B .
B An economy with a housing rental market
B.1 The household’s problem
A household derives utility from consumption of a nondurable good, c, and housing services. Hous-
ing services can be acquired in the market or through homeownership. The price per unit of housing
services is i. f denotes housing services acquired through the rental market. We assume households
cannot be renters and homeowners at the same time. Households may hold both ﬁnancial assets,
a, and residential assets, h. The stock of houses h is illiquid and cannot be fully ﬁnanced.







πe,e  v(e ,a  ,d  )
s.t. c + if+ a  + h  − (1 − δh)h + τ(h ,h)=we+( 1+r) a
s =( 1− z)f + zh  ,
a  +( 1− θ)h  ≥ 0.
(13)
B.2 The ﬁrm’s problem
The representative ﬁrm solves the following static problem:
max
Kt,Lt




Kt − wL t, (14)
where Lt denotes aggregate labor, r is the rental price of capital net of depreciation and w is the
wage per eﬃciency unit of labor.
B.3 The ﬁnancial institution’s problem
The ﬁnancial institution receives ﬁnancial assets from households and rents capital to ﬁrms and
residential services to households. We allow rental units to have a diﬀerent depreciation rate than
23owner occupied housing. The ﬁnancial institution solves the following problem:
Ψ(A)= m a x
A ,K,F







s. t. K + F ≤ A,
(15)
where F is the stock of rental units and i is the rental price.
B.4 Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium for this economy is a set of functions for the household problem
{v(x),ga(x),gh(x),gc(x),gf(x)}, and a measure of households, µ, such that:
1. Total labor services are obtained aggregating across households, L =

X ed µ .
2. Total ﬁnancial assets equal A =

X ga(x) dµ.
3. The rental market for housing clears, F =

X gf(x) dµ.
4. The aggregate capital stock is K = A − F.
5. Factor rental prices are factor marginal productivities, r = F1(K,L)−δk,a n dw = F2(K,L).
6. The rental price of housing satisﬁes i = r + δf.
7. Given µ,a n dr the functions

v,ga,gh,gf,gc
solve the household’s problem in (13).













9. The feasibility constraint is satisﬁed: C =

X gc(x) dµ, C + δkK + Ih = F (K,L).
10. The measure of households is stationary: x(B)=

X Q(x,B) dµ, for all B ⊂B .
C Computational Procedures
In order to compute the equilibrium of our benchmark model, it is convenient to reformulate the
household problem. Deﬁne voluntary equity as the wealth held in excess of the required down
payment, q ≡ a +( 1− θ)h. The state variables for the household problem are the earnings shock,
voluntary equity, and the housing stock, {e,q,h}. With this reformulation, we deal with two assets
24whose values are restricted to be non-negative. This greatly simpliﬁes the problem imposed by the
endogenous liquidity constraint in the solution of the household problem.
Let Q be aggregate voluntary equity. Feasibility becomes:
C + Q  − (1 − δk)Q + θH  +[ ( 1− δk)(1 − θ) − (1 − δh)(1 − Iρ)]H = F (Q − (1 − θ)H,L ).
Factor prices can easily be written in terms of Q and H. The household problem can be rewritten
as follows:
















(1 − Iρ) − (1 − θ)(1+r)

h − q  − θh . (17)
Because of the non-convex adjustment cost, we use a ﬁnite state approximation approach to solve
the household problem. The technique consists of specifying a ﬁnite-state (discrete) problem that
approximates the continuous one we want to solve. With our reformulation, today’s controls are
next period’s states and the grids for both assets start at zero. The upper values for the grids
must be chosen with care by trial and error. We solve the problem by value function iteration.
We guess an initial value function and make agents choose next period’s values of q  and h  in the
grid. Choosing values of the policy function in a two-dimensional grid can be computationally very
costly. We use a policy function accelerator described in Judd (1998) to speed up convergence. To
compute the steady state of the model we use standard procedures.
For the results reported in this paper we use 300 hundred grid points for voluntary equity and
100 points for the housing stock (the grid points are not equally space to maximize eﬃciency).
With 7 exogenous earnings shocks, this implies solving the household’s problem for 210,000 points
at each iteration. To verify that our results are robust to the density of the grids, we solve a
few speciﬁcations with twice as many points for each asset (600 for voluntary equity and 200 for
housing; solving the household problem once takes approximately 37 hours in an Intel Core 2 duo
R6600 processor). Table 12 presents wealth distribution statistics equivalent to those in Table 4 for
the benchmark case. The Gini coeﬃcients and quintiles are extremely similar in both cases (the
diﬀerences for the Gini indices are at the third decimal place). Of course, parameter values have
25to be adjusted to obtain the same aggregates with more points. The changes, however, are again
minimal (δh =0 .365 with more points vs. 0.367 with fewer points; β =0 .9003 with more points
vs. β =0 .9006 with fewer points). Since the diﬀerences are not very signiﬁcant, we proceeded with
fewer grid points to save computational time.
26Table 1: Selected data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances
Households with Positive Earnings
Quintiles Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th coeﬀ.
Earnings, E 3.26 8.71 14.08 21.09 52.83 0.497
Houses, H 0.00 1.60 12.67 22.27 63.45 0.649
Financial assets, A –8.52 –0.79 0.96 6.33 101.97 0.945
Wealth, W –0.33 1.36 4.85 11.81 82.27 0.804
H/W(1) 280.89 113.27 73.16 26.76
H/W(2) 4260.07 313.40 137.88 82.38 46.71
Homeowners by E % 46.56 52.28 69.06 83.62 91.72
Households with Positive Earnings without the top 1 % earn.
Quintiles Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th coeﬀ.
Earnings, E 3.71 9.91 15.94 23.81 46.62 0.432
Houses, H 0.00 1.60 13.35 23.40 61.65 0.634
Financial assets, A –11.72 –1.13 1.25 8.13 103.43 0.941
Wealth, W –0.42 1.64 5.84 14.08 78.84 0.771
H/W(1) 290.25 114.29 74.70 30.77
H/W(2) 4399.67 318.54 139.82 83.48 47.97
Homeowners by E % 46.43 52.16 68.44 83.15 91.72
All Households
Quintiles Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th coeﬀ.
Earnings, E –0.16 4.19 13.06 22.93 59.98 0.606
Houses, H 0.00 1.40 12.31 22.08 64.21 0.656
Financial assets, A –7.27 –0.25 1.14 6.92 99.45 0.953
Wealth, W –0.29 1.35 5.14 12.38 81.42 0.796
H/W(1) 237.60 103.83 69.68 26.97
H/W(2) 4381.90 289.26 124.78 77.13 45.89
Homeowners by E % 65.40 48.44 58.70 75.87 91.51
Notes: Households are ordered by the variable indicated in each row, except for the rows
labeled ‘H/W’ in which households are ordered by total wealth, W. (1): Sum of housing
wealth in the quintile divided by total wealth in the quintile. (2): The mean housing
wealth to total wealth ratio in the quintile.
27Table 2: The earnings process
The earnings shocks, e
0.18 0.34 0.51 0.73 1.09 2.36 14.15
The transition matrix, πe,e 
0.910833 0.088657 0.000010 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.0005
0.088657 0.781730 0.128927 0.000186 0.000000 0.000000 0.0005
0.000010 0.128927 0.729050 0.141327 0.000186 0.000000 0.0005
0.000000 0.000186 0.141327 0.729050 0.128927 0.000010 0.0005
0.000000 0.000000 0.000186 0.128927 0.781730 0.088657 0.0005
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000010 0.088657 0.910833 0.0005
0.008250 0.008250 0.008250 0.008250 0.008250 0.008250 0.9505
Stationary distribution, π∗
0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.010
Table 3: Parameters
Technology Finan. arrang. Utility
αδ k δh δf θρ β σ γ
Benchmark 0.255 0.117 0.037 - 0.2 0.05 0.901 2 0.166
One asset 0.255 0.117 0.043 0.000 0.0 0.00 0.904 2 0.161
Choice 0.255 0.117 0.042 0.006 0.2 0.05 0.901 2 0.176
High min. size 0.255 0.117 0.043 0.000 0.2 0.05 0.904 2 0.161
Notes: α is the capital share, δ
k and δ
h are the depreciation rates for capital and owner-occupied houses
respectively. δ
f is the additional depreciation rate for rental units. θ and ρ are the down payment and
the adjustment cost parameter respectively. β is the discount factor, σ measures risk aversion and γ is the
parameter in the utility function that weights the importance of housing relative to nondurable consumption.
28Table 4: The wealth distribution
Quintiles % Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th index
Earnings 4.18 7.99 12.57 19.64 55.60 0.499
Earnings without top 1% 4.78 9.13 14.34 22.32 49.42 0.433
Benchmark economy
Houses 4.06 7.88 13.47 23.63 50.95 0.483
Financial assets –5.70 –3.14 –1.85 7.89 102.77 0.930
Wealth 0.38 1.12 2.96 13.85 81.67 0.801
Wealth without top 1% 0.48 1.42 3.69 16.92 77.47 0.750
H/W(1) 339.36 179.92 67.90 24.05
H/W(2) 459.35 310.71 194.06 76.37 33.73
One-asset economy
Wealth 0.09 0.67 2.52 14.10 82.61 0.816
Wealth without top 1% 0.11 0.85 3.10 17.26 78.68 0.770
Choice
Houses 0.00 4.19 14.30 25.11 56.41 0.585
Financial assets –4.74 –1.20 0.36 8.63 96.95 0.911
Wealth 0.08 0.86 2.98 13.99 82.09 0.809
Wealth without top 1% 0.09 1.08 3.70 17.05 78.06 0.761
H/W(1) 222.40 173.04 60.53 22.49
H/W(2) 0.00 333.58 194.78 68.67 33.36
Homeowners by E. % 18.38 54.80 84.98 97.29 91.20
High minimum size economy
Wealth 0.09 0.68 2.53 14.12 82.57 0.816
Wealth without top 1% 0.11 0.86 3.11 17.30 78.61 0.769
Notes: Households are ordered by the variable indicated in each row, except for the rows labeled
‘H/W’ in which households are ordered by total wealth, W. (1): Sum of housing wealth in the
quintile divided by total wealth in the quintile. (2): The mean housing wealth to total wealth
ratio in the quintile. The rows labeled ‘without top 1%’ do not include households on the top
1% of the earnings distribution.
There is no rental market in the benchmark economy. In the one-asset economy, there is a
perfect rental market. In the choice economy, there is a rental market with moral hazard. In
the high-minimum-size economy, there is a perfect rental market and the minimum house size
for sale is so large that all households rent. All economies are calibrated so that they produce
the same aggregates ratios H/C, H/Y and K/Y . Parameters summarized in Table 3.
29Table 5: The wealth distribution without superstars
Quintiles % Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th index
Earnings 4.78 9.13 14.34 22.32 49.42 0.433
Benchmark economy
Houses 4.89 9.56 15.49 26.45 43.61 0.400
Financial assets –3.88 –2.07 1.71 23.82 80.43 0.781
Wealth 0.56 2.38 7.20 24.80 65.06 0.645
H/W(1) 208.04 87.05 42.75 25.34
H/W(2) 412.44 181.98 93.22 45.36 26.32
One-asset economy
Wealth 0.24 1.98 7.05 25.50 65.24 0.654
Choice
Houses 0.00 4.10 16.45 29.19 50.25 0.531
Financial assets –1.87 0.49 3.54 22.88 74.96 0.736
Wealth 0.21 2.00 7.25 24.90 65.64 0.656
H/W(1) 89.36 80.46 40.06 25.16
H/W(2) 391.43 167.18 91.04 42.68 26.13
Homeowners by E. % 28.15 53.33 73.69 93.19 93.60
Notes: Households are ordered by the variable indicated in each row, except for the rows
labeled ‘H/W’ in which households are ordered by total wealth, W. (1): Sum of housing
wealth in the quintile divided by total wealth in the quintile. (2): The mean housing
wealth to total wealth ratio in the quintile.
All economies are calibrated so that they produce the same aggregates ratios H/C, H/Y
and K/Y . α =0 .255, δ
k =0 .117 σ = 2 in the three economies. In the one-asset economy,
θ =0a n dρ =0v s . θ =0 .2a n dρ =0 .05 in the other cases. β is 0.915, 0.916 and 0.918
in benchmark, the choice and the one-asset economy respectively. γ is 0.165, 0.169 and
0.161, in the benchmark, the choice and the one-asset economy. δ
h is 0.037, 0.04 and 0.043
in benchmark, the choice and the one-asset economy respectively. δ
f =0 .005 in the choice
economy and 0 in the one-asset economy.
Table 6: The volatile earnings process
The earnings shocks, e
0.18 0.34 0.51 0.73 1.09 2.36 14.15
The transition matrix, πe,e 
0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.0005
0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.0005
0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.0005
0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.0005
0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.0005
0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.16658 0.0005
0.00825 0.00825 0.00825 0.00825 0.00825 0.00825 0.9505
Stationary distribution, π∗
0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.010
30Table 7: The wealth distribution with volatile earnings
Quintiles % Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th index
Earnings 4.18 7.99 12.57 19.64 55.60 0.499
Volatile Benchmark economy
Houses 11.24 16.19 16.42 18.47 37.68 0.256
Financial assets –4.32 0.02 5.81 12.65 85.84 0.863
Wealth 2.55 6.37 10.28 14.76 66.05 0.635
H/W(1) 127.81 65.75 48.55 21.41
H/W(2) 239.09 104.07 66.46 49.00 32.78
Volatile One-asset Economy
Wealth 1.85 5.49 9.32 13.83 69.49 0.676
Volatile Choice Economy
Houses 0.00 10.00 22.75 25.94 41.31 0.436
Financial assets –1.33 2.90 6.80 11.78 79.85 0.796
Wealth 1.84 5.87 9.89 14.60 67.80 0.660
H/W(1) 66.64 55.39 49.36 16.66
H/W(2) 214.97 121.27 72.07 50.47 32.53
Homeowners by E. % 63.57 65.91 67.48 71.00 76.95
Notes: Households are ordered by the variable indicated in each row, except for the rows
labeled ‘H/W’ in which households are ordered by total wealth, W. (1): Sum of housing
wealth in the quintile divided by total wealth in the quintile. (2): The mean housing
wealth to total wealth ratio in the quintile.
All economies are calibrated so that they produce the same aggregates ratios H/C, H/Y
and K/Y . α =0 .255, δ
k =0 .117 σ = 2 in the three economies. In the one-asset economy,
θ =0a n dρ =0v s . θ =0 .2a n dρ =0 .05 in the other cases. β is 0.903, 0.906 and 0.909
in benchmark, the choice and the one-asset economy respectively. γ is 0.158, 0.161 and
0.161 in benchmark, the choice and the one-asset economy respectively. δ
h is 0.037, 0.041
and 0.043 in benchmark, the choice and the one-asset economy respectively. δ
f =0 .003
in the choice economy and 0 in the one-asset economy.
31Table 8: The wealth distribution for homeowners
Quintiles % Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th index
Homeowners with positive earnings in the SCF-98
Earnings 3.81 9.46 14.41 20.43 51.87 0.479
Houses 3.95 9.36 13.33 20.21 53.13 0.485
Financial assets –7.71 –1.73 1.24 7.88 100.30 0.938
Wealth 0.69 3.15 6.21 12.58 77.35 0.745
H/W(1) 194.00 91.81 67.05 24.33
H/W(2) 755.94 147.96 92.88 68.39 40.00
Homeowners in the choice economy
Earnings 6.30 10.20 14.24 21.09 48.16 0.408
Houses 6.59 10.37 14.22 24.65 44.17 0.397
Financial assets –4.03 –2.28 1.69 14.77 89.84 0.875
Wealth 0.90 2.03 6.35 17.78 72.93 0.728
H/W(1) 226.50 83.30 48.28 21.61
H/W(2) 319.90 199.17 90.68 49.98 29.50
Homeowners in the volatile choice economy
Earnings 4.51 8.64 13.54 21.39 51.92 0.449
Houses 15.36 15.58 17.89 17.89 33.27 0.179
Financial assets –2.09 3.32 8.01 13.20 77.57 0.776
Wealth 4.72 8.26 11.30 14.76 60.95 0.560
H/W(1) 93.56 54.68 43.24 19.00
H/W(2) 137.14 75.56 54.96 43.51 29.73
Notes: Households are ordered by the variable indicated in each row, except for the rows
labeled ‘H/W’ in which households are ordered by total wealth, W. (1): Sum of housing
wealth in the quintile divided by total wealth in the quintile. (2): The mean housing
wealth to total wealth ratio in the quintile.
32Table 9: Distribution of houses and earnings for homeowners
Quintiles % Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th index
Homeowners with positive earnings in the SCF-89
Earnings 3.89 10.01 15.02 21.12 49.94 0.458
Houses 3.15 8.12 12.94 21.66 54.10 0.507
Homeowners with positive earnings in the SCF-92
Earnings 3.44 9.11 14.52 20.92 52.00 0.485
Houses 3.76 8.71 13.61 20.72 53.19 0.491
Homeowners with positive earnings in the SCF-95
Earnings 3.65 9.26 14.53 20.63 51.90 0.483
Houses 3.93 9.64 14.24 20.99 51.19 0.469
Homeowners with positive earnings in the SCF-98
Earnings 3.81 9.46 14.41 20.43 51.87 0.479
Houses 3.95 9.36 13.33 20.21 53.13 0.485
Homeowners with positive earnings in the SCF-01
Earnings 3.48 8.70 13.44 19.83 54.55 0.510
Houses 3.85 7.97 12.13 19.28 56.77 0.523
Homeowners with positive earnings in the SCF-04
Earnings 3.67 9.21 14.23 21.53 51.33 0.478
Houses 3.46 7.84 11.78 19.19 57.70 0.535
Notes: Households are ordered by the variable indicated in the corre-
sponding row. Owned calculations using the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances.
Table 10: Aggregate ratios and inequality indices for diﬀerent down payments
ρ =0 .05 ρ =1 0 ρ =0
θ (%) 0 5 20* 50 100 20 20 0
Y 0.998 0.999 1.000 1.004 1.010 1.004 0.993 0.991
K 1.626 1.629 1.638 1.664 1.702 1.666 1.591 1.583
H 1.061 1.066 1.068 1.061 1.044 1.045 1.130 1.132
K + H 2.687 2.695 2.706 2.725 2.745 2.710 2.721 2.714
GDP 1.080 1.080 1.081 1.082 1.084 1.081 1.082 1.082
K/GPD 1.505 1.508 1.515 1.537 1.569 1.540 1.470 1.463
H/GDP 0.989 0.987 0.988 0.980 0.963 0.966 1.045 1.046
(K + H)/GDP 2.494 2.496 2.504 2.517 2.532 2.506 2.515 2.510
H/C 1.395 1.394 1.396 1.383 1.358 1.363 1.477 1.479
r (%) 3.996 3.972 3.909 3.730 3.473 3.714 4.250 4.312
Gini Index, H 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.491 0.506 0.473 0.499 0.497
Gini Index, K 0.936 0.935 0.930 0.920 0.887 0.929 0936 0.939
Gini Index, W 0.810 0.808 0.801 0.779 0.736 0.796 0.801 0.810
Notes: *Benchmark case. All Parameters as in the benchmark economy except the parameters
indicated. K is capital, H are houses, W is wealth and r is the interest rate. θ and ρ are the down
payment parameter and the adjustment cost parameter, respectively. Aggregates normalized by
output, Y , of the benchmark model.
33Table 11: Wealth composition for diﬀerent down payments
Wealth Quintiles
θρ 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
0 0.05 2059.99 379.70 205.93 76.31 33.84
5 0.05 1434.55 356.57 202.60 77.14 33.89
20* 0.05 459.35 310.71 194.06 76.37 33.73
50 0.05 186.16 178.00 152.75 74.63 34.61
100 0.05 95.36 93.21 90.25 69.72 37.78
0.2 10 424.28 285.68 184.41 74.86 32.04
0.2 0 463.86 345.42 212.42 72.58 37.13
0 0 2599.92 471.22 218.35 72.93 36.90
Notes: *Benchmark case. Numbers are the average residential
house-wealth ratio in the quintile.
Table 12: The benchmark economy with more grid points
Quintiles Gini
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th coeﬀ.
Earnings, E 4.18 7.99 12.57 19.64 55.61 0.499
Houses, H 4.04 8.09 13.35 23.46 51.06 0.483
Financial assets, A –5.77 –3.18 –1.82 8.11 102.66 0.932
Wealth, W 0.38 1.13 2.97 13.89 81.63 0.801
H/W(1) 339.90 181.64 66.99 24.09
H/W(2) 456.24 314.89 196.35 74.70 33.81
Notes: Households are ordered by the variable indicated in each row, except for the rows
labeled ‘H/W’ in which households are ordered by total wealth, W. (1): Sum of housing
wealth in the quintile divided by total wealth in the quintile. (2): The mean housing
wealth to total wealth ratio in the quintile.
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